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1 Introduction
Transportation accounts for 20% of global greenhouse gas emissions and policymakers are taking
up the challenge to reduce the use of polluting petroleum liquids. Emission standards are one of
the primary policy tools used to achieve this goal. This type of regulation sets mandatory limits on
average emission rates (or fuel economy) across the fleet. These policies are simple to prescribe and
do not explicitly tax consumers or producers. This paper studies the introduction of the emission
standard in the EU and tries to estimate the welfare effects of the EU policy.
The EU regulation aimed to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars by 18%. The policy was
announced in 2007 and became fully binding from 2015, after a phase-in period that started in 2012.
The regulation targets CO2 emissions, which is equivalent to targeting fuel consumption or fuel-
efficiency.1 The EU standard is interesting to study for three reasons. First, it is a very demanding
standard with a target of 130 g CO2/km. For comparison, the US standard required only 152 g
CO2/km in 2016. Second, before the standard, the EU had no regulation on CO2 emissions. The
introduction of the standard thus allows me to study how the market equilibrium changes with
the introduction of an emission standard. Third, the EU standard is an attribute-based regulation
(ABR); the policy target not only depends on CO2 emission but also on the attribute vehicle weight.
The attribute basing makes the policy target less stringent for firms producing heavier vehicles.2
Understanding the effects of the EU standard is helpful to guide the design of this type of regulation
in the future and in other markets across the world.
Evaluating the welfare impact of emission standards is not an easy task. Firms can choose
between different abatement strategies to comply with a standard, and these strategies have dif-
ferent effects on market equilibrium. The first strategy is to change pricing to shift the sales mix
to vehicles with CO2 emissions below the target. I define this strategy as mix-shifting. A second
strategy is downsizing, i.e., releasing smaller but more fuel efficient vehicles. A third strategy is
technology adoption, i.e., improving the fuel-efficiency of the vehicle fleet. A fourth strategy is
gaming, i.e., improving the emissions as measured in official ratings without improving the actual
emission on the road. Throughout the paper, I refer to official CO2 emissions as the emission
ratings that firms report from lab tests and actual CO2 emissions as the emissions that vehicles
emit on the road. These strategies change the prices, product attributes, product sets, and market
outcomes in different ways. Firms choose the abatement strategy that has the lowest cost while
taking into account the strategy chosen by competing firms. Additionally, the design of the policy
matters for the costs of different abatement strategies. This paper presents a model that accounts
for firms’ abatement strategies and the design of the policy to evaluate the EU standard.
1 CO2 cannot be filtered during the combustion process. Fuel consumption translates proportionally into grams
of CO2 per km, with a different CO2 content per liter for diesel and gasoline. Fuel consumption (liters per kilometer)
and CO2 emissions per kilometer are the inverse of fuel economy (miles per gallon).
2The International Council on Clean Transportation (2014) compares the different regulations between countries.
The EU has the goal of decreasing emissions to 95 g/km by 2021, the US has communicated a goal of 103 g/km by
2025, Japan has a goal 105 g/km by 2020, and China has a goal of 117 g/km by 2020. The US and Japan have also
introduced attribute basing in their regulations.
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In the first step, I explain the trend in sales-weighted official CO2 emissions between 1998 and
2011 in the EU market. Knittel (2011) shows that vehicles sold on the US market change between
1980 and 2006 in terms of the amount of attributes that automakers offer relative to fuel economy
and interprets this as technological progress. I follow his approach and estimate technological
improvements in the trade-off that firms face between emissions and other vehicle characteristics.
I find that official emissions reduce by 14% after the policy announcement. This reduction is
explained by decreases in official emissions of vehicles, while the attributes and the product set
offered by firms do not change, showing no downsizing. The results show that technological progress
is twice as fast after the regulatory announcement, in line with the findings of Klier and Linn (2016).
Firms respond to emission standards by increasing the speed of technology adoption, at least when
we look at the official emission ratings. Reynaert and Sallee (2020) study the fuel-efficiency of
thousands of vehicles on the road to find significant gaming in the market. Emission ratings
improve on paper, but these improvements do not translate to the road. Using these estimates of
on-road fuel efficiency, I find that only 30% of the increased technology adoption is measurable on
the road so that 70% is due to gaming.
The observed decrease in the official emission ratings is so strong that almost all of the firms
reached the emission target before it became partly binding in 2012. However, looking at market
outcomes before and after the policy is insufficient to find the welfare effects of the policy as we
cannot separate the policy from the effects of changes in local regulations and taxes. Many EU
member states began changing vehicle taxation after 2007, clearly contributing to the downward
trend in emissions.3 Demand, costs, and market fundamentals potentially change in the eight-
year gap between the policy announcement and implementation. I resort to a structural model
to simulate the impact of the emission standard. The model allows me to single out the impact
of the policy and to study how that impact changes when I change the policy design. In the
counterfactual, I assume that the product sets of the firms and the product attributes are fixed. I
then model heterogeneous consumers making discrete choices between vehicles. The firms have three
strategic choices: mix-shifting, technology adoption, and gaming. I study how equilibrium changes
with each strategic choice. To simulate the model, I need estimates of the following primitives:
preferences and price elasticities, marginal costs, changes in costs from technology adoption, and
changes in costs from gaming.
To estimate these primitives, I rely on the rich panel data from before the policy announce-
ment when firms’ decisions are not affected. I estimate demand following the framework of Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and extend the model to allow for multiple endogenous character-
istics: fuel economy, horsepower, and weight in addition to prices. I instrument the endogenous
characteristics with variables that use exogenous variation in the competitive environment, the
global sales of vehicles, and the manufacturing structure. Given the estimated demand, the first-
order conditions of the profit function provide estimates of the marginal costs of vehicles as well
3See for example the French bonus malus discussed in Durrmeyer (2018) and the Swedish rebate discussed in Huse
and Lucinda (2014).
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as the marginal benefits and costs of supplying fuel consumption (and emissions). The regulation
increases the marginal benefit of lowering fuel consumption, as vehicles with lower emissions help
the firm attain the standard. To predict how marginal cost increases with technology adoption, I
rely on two approaches. First, I use the observed correlation in the data between fuel consumption
and marginal cost. Second, I use engineering predictions submitted with the policy proposal, see
TNO (2011). In line with recent evidence presented by Whitefoot, Fowlie, and Skerlos (2017), these
engineering predictions show that fuel consumption is relatively adjustable in the short term with
available technology. Given this evidence, I choose to model improvements in fuel consumption as
a continuous choice that is made simultaneously with pricing. Finally, I need an estimate for the
costs of gaming. The costs of gaming consist of the expected litigation and the cost of emission
test falsification. These costs are challenging to estimate, and I rely on the level of gaming from
the emission decomposition. The estimated model with multiple strategic decisions on continuous
variables is similar to the recent contributions of Fan (2013) and Crawford, Shcherbakov, and Shum
(2019).4
Given the estimated primitives, I introduce the EU policy in the model and simulate how it
impacts the market equilibrium. Increases in costs from technology adoption beyond the willingness
to pay for fuel consumption imply that the regulation decreases consumer surplus and profits.
Because of the gaming, the reductions in actual CO2 emissions are a mere 5% instead of the 18%
target. The sum of the value of emission savings and consumer and profit losses is negative so
that the regulation reduces welfare. However, when I consider two additional non-targeted welfare
effects, I find the emission standard to have a small positive impact. The two additional welfare
effects are reductions in other externalities (local pollution, congestion, and accident risk) and
correction of consumer undervaluation of fuel economy. I estimate that consumers do not fully
take into account future fuel expenses, so when the regulation provides consumers with more fuel-
efficient vehicles, this increases their experience utility. The simulation also reveals that when I
restrict firms to mix-shifting, the standard has different welfare effects. The total sales and actual
emissions sharply decrease at a very high cost for consumers and firms.
Next, I study how the design of the regulation induced firms to choose the combination of
technology adoption and gaming. I first study the attribute basing which makes the emission
target dependent on vehicle weight. Firms selling more lightweight vehicles face a more stringent
attribute-based target. I find that attribute basing makes abatement with mix-shifting much more
costly because firms have to distort prices more to reach the target. If the regulation has a flat target
without attribute basing, firms would opt for mix-shifting and technology adoption. The flat target
reaches actual CO2 emission reductions of 11%, much closer to the 18% target. Why, then, was the
attribute basing introduced? The simulations show that the positions of the governments are in line
with the interests of their firms. The attribute basing redistributes the incidence of the regulation
between French, Italian, and German producers. Newspaper articles show that French and Italian
4Another option would have been to model technology adoption as a discrete choice for firms in a two-stage model,
as in Eizenberg (2014) or Wollmann (2018). However, this approach is computationally less suited for a market with
hundreds of products and a continuous characteristic, such as improvements in fuel consumption.
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governments were in favor of regulation without attribute basing, while Germany lobbied for a
steep attribute design.5 Additionally, gaming is a product of the political environment. A recent
evaluation by the European Parliament (Gieseke and Gerbandy (2017)) has placed responsibility
for enforcement failures with the car producing member states. The countries failed to detect and
respond to gaming timely. The attribute basing and enforcement failures show the importance of
the political environment for the effectiveness of emission standards.
The paper makes several contributions. First, I show that emission standards can induce tech-
nology adoption and gaming by firms. Previous literature does not study the equilibrium effects of
the abatement strategies in detail. The literature studying the CAFE standard in the US treats
changes in the level of technology as a possible longer-run effect of emission standards and has
not focused on the welfare effects of gaming. Second, by estimating a structural model of demand
and supply, I show that the incidence and welfare effects of the regulation vary drastically between
abatement strategies. Third, the model allows me to study how the design of the regulation affects
the outcomes. Attribute basing increased the pressure on firms to adopt technology, and weak
enforcement allowed for gaming so that the policy missed its emission reduction target. These
contributions show that it is crucial to take the supply responses carefully into account when eval-
uating and designing emission standards. Finally, this is the first paper providing a detailed study
of the EU regulation and its impacts on market outcomes.
Related Literature The framework in this paper builds on the existing work of Knittel (2011),
Jacobsen (2013), and Reynaert and Sallee (2020). The emission decomposition follows the estima-
tion in Knittel (2011), but I find that the speed of technology adoption changes when the policy
is announced. Jacobsen (2013) incorporates heterogeneous responses from both consumers and
producers in a structural model to evaluate the US CAFE standard. In an extension Jacobsen
(2013) also considers technology adoption using the framework of Austin and Dinan (2005) in
which firms respond to an emission standard by changing both prices and technology. While Ja-
cobsen (2013) finds that technology adoption limits the welfare losses of standards, I show that
technology adoption could lead to welfare losses or gains depending on the cost-effectiveness of the
technology relative to consumers willingness to pay for fuel consumption.6 My analysis contributes
by considering an equilibrium model where firms choose between the compliance options of mix-
shifting, technology adoption, and gaming. Reynaert and Sallee (2020) estimate the amount of
gaming in the EU market. I use these on-road fuel efficiency estimates to disentangle official from
actual emissions. I also use the framework to estimate the effects of gaming on consumer surplus
which depend on consumer awareness of gaming. Here, I embed the interaction between choice
and gaming in the full equilibrium model with other abatement strategies, and I focus on overall
5 See ”EU unveils tough emissions curbs for cars” - Financial Times, February 7, 2007, and ”France battles
Germany over car emissions” - Financial Times, November 15, 2007.
6Other notable differences are the demand model where I estimate price elasticities on the engine level (more than
400 products per market) rather than the broad category level (including 12 products), and I allow for endogenous
characteristics. The model of Jacobsen (2013) is richer in other dimensions as it incorporates effects on the second-
hand market as well as changes in the vehicle miles traveled as modeled in Bento, Goulder, Jacobsen, and von Haefen
(2009)
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welfare rather than consumer welfare.
This paper adds to a body of literature that studies policies targeting vehicle emissions, reviewed
in Anderson and Sallee (2016). Holland, Hughes, and Knittel (2009) show that none of the welfare
effects of emission standards are theoretically determined. A standard might decrease or increase
emissions from new vehicles, depending on the distribution of the price elasticities of products
below and above the emission target. The welfare effects of standards become even more uncertain
when we consider the variety of different abatement strategies. The empirical literature on emission
standards has focused on the US CAFE standard. Goldberg (1998) was the first to consider the
effect of standards on price setting and the composition of the vehicle fleet. Anderson and Sallee
(2011) use a loophole in the regulation to show that the standard is hardly binding in recent
years. Jacobsen (2013) finds that the US CAFE standard imposes a substantial shadow cost on
domestic firms. Both Klier and Linn (2012) and Whitefoot, Fowlie, and Skerlos (2017) evaluate the
welfare effects of emission standards while introducing endogenous product characteristics in the
model and allowing firms to change vehicle characteristics. Both of these papers assume that the
level of technology is fixed and consider the optimization of product offerings on a fixed trade-off
function between emissions and attributes. I allow the trade-off relation to change but impose that
improvements must reduce fuel consumption, in line with the empirical evidence in Europe. Ito
and Sallee (2018) and Whitefoot and Skerlos (2012) discuss the economic effects of attribute-based
regulations. The analysis here is complementary as I study different effects of attribute basing, i.e.,
the cost of different abatement strategies and the political economy behind the attribute basing.
Recent work has considered additional margins of the policy. Jacobsen and van Benthem (2015)
study the effect of emission standards on vehicle scrap rates. Durrmeyer and Samano (2018)
compare a standard with a rebate policy that explicitly subsidizes and taxes emissions above and
below the target. Bento, Gillingham, and Roth (2017) focus on the effect of the fuel standard on
the dispersion in vehicle weight and its effect on accidents.7
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the policy and available data. Section 3
decomposes the changes in emissions in the EU automobile market between 2007 and 2011. Section
4 presents the emission standard in a model of supply and demand and discusses the possible effects
of the different abatement strategies. Section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 presents
the results of policy simulations, and Section 7 concludes.
2 The EU emission standard and data
The EU emission standard The European regulation on emission standards for new passenger
cars, Regulation (EC) No. 443/2009, sets a mandatory fleet average of κ =130 grams CO2 per
kilometer. Denoting the sales of each product j by qj and the emissions of each product by ej , the
7These margins play a role in the current policy debate in the US as discussed in Bento, Gillingham, Jacobsen,
Knittel, Leard, Linn, McConnell, Rapson, Sallee, van Benthem, and Whitefoot (2018).
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target for a firm is as follows: ∑
jεfleet qj(ej − f(wj))∑
jεfleet qj
≤ 130. (1)
The target binds over each producer’s fleet of new vehicles sold in a calendar year. The trading
of excess emissions between producers is not allowed.8 The attribute basing f(wjm) = a(wj − w0)
adjusts the emissions of each vehicle by the distance in the vehicle weight wj from a shifting point
w0 (the pivotal weight point). The shifting point w0 is a mass of 1370 kg and the difference in
weight from that point is multiplied by a = 0.046.9 Figure 1 plots the target and the distance from
the target for each producer in 2007 and 2011. When producers exceed the standard, they have to
pay premiums for excess emissions. The premium is e5 per unit sold for the first excess g/km and
increases to e95 per unit above 134 g/km. A manufacturer obtaining a sales-weighted emission of
146 g/km, the average in 2007, would face a significant penalty of e1,280 per vehicle (against an
average sales price of e22,250). The regulation was proposed by the European Commission in 2007
and became law in 2009. Deters (2010) gives an overview of the full legislative process and political
background. In 2012, 65% of manufacturer’s sales had to comply with the emission standard. This
share rose to 75% in 2013 and 80% in 2014, and the standard was fully binding from 2015 onward.
I do not model the phase-in period. Every firm succeeded in reaching the full target by 2014.
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Firm compliance in 2007 and 2011 Regulation
The starting point of each arrow gives the sales-weighted CO2 and mass for each producer in 2007. The end of each
arrow gives the same point in 2011. The dashed diagonal line is the regulation, which binds in 2015.
8Manufacturers can obtain lower average emissions by gathering super credits. These credits are given for vehicles
that emit less than 50 g/km. Small manufacturers making less than 30,000 vehicles per year face separate standards.
I ignore both of the exceptions as they count for a tiny share of the total market.
9The average SUV in the data weighs 1650 kg, and the average compact car weighs 1250 kg. The SUV’s emissions
are scaled down while the compact car’s emissions are scaled up.
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EU member states heavily debated the specifics of the regulation during the drafting of the
law. Lobbying efforts by EU member states, firms, and environmental groups were covered by
news outlets; see Footnote 5. France and Italy were strongly in favor of a flat standard. At the
same time, Germany wanted an ABR with an upward sloping target function in either weight or
footprint (the rectangular area in between the wheels of the vehicle). The German firms BMW,
Daimler, and Volkswagen, on average, make heavier vehicles than Fiat (Italian), Renault, and PSA
(French). The political agreement was to have an ABR with a slope of a = 0.046 that aimed at
equalizing compliance efforts between firms. The production of each firm mostly takes place within
the home country, and the automobile sector is an important source for employment.10
It is instructive to compare the EU policy with the US CAFE standard since this policy has been
the subject of several studies. The CAFE standard came into place in 1978 and after a gradual
phase-in has been constant at 27.5 mpg since 1990 (this corresponds to 198 g CO2/km). From
2009 onward, the CAFE standards are tightened towards 36 mpg in 2016 (this corresponds to 152
g CO2/km). Contrary to the EU standard, light trucks (SUVs) face a different, less demanding
target than passenger cars. Additionally, firms are allowed to trade excess emissions over time and
with other firms.11 From 2012 onward, the CAFE standard also has an attribute-based part, i.e.,
the target varies with the footprint.
The EU Commission relied on several studies to support the design of the EU emission standard,
see TNO (2011). The policy report only includes possible technology adoptions that should be
readily available for the car makers at no fixed or development costs. In designing the regulation,
the policymaker clearly had the channel of technology adoption in mind. The document lists which
technologies are available and how adoption affects marginal cost.12
The New European Driving Cycle (NEDC) is the procedure to determine official CO2 emissions
and fuel consumption.13 The procedure takes a single vehicle (the golden vehicle) and optimizes
that vehicle for the test. Tape, non-resistant tires, and software referred to as defeat devices,
make the engine run in a program specialized for the test. None of these features impact how the
consumers experience vehicles on the road, nor do they impact the marginal cost of production.
I define gaming as the firm efforts that decrease the official emission ratings but not the actual
10The car industry represents 6.1% of EU employment and 11.4% of manufacturing employment, see
https://www.acea.be/statistics/tag/category/employment-trends, read on March 4, 2020.
11Contrary to the CAFE standards in the US, the EU standard has no banking system for excess emissions. The
penalties in the EU are lower for low excess emissions but increase to higher levels than the penalties for breaking
the US CAFE standards.
12The technologies are reduced friction, direct injection, variable valve timing and actuation, more efficient
transmissions, engine start-stop, improved aerodynamics, low rolling resistance tires, and improvements in ancil-
lary systems and auxiliaries can be used to reduce emissions. The document also considers engine downsizing,
weight savings, and hybridization, which I do not consider to be technology adoption as they involve downsizing
the vehicle. Knittel (2011) also gives several examples of specific technologies implemented in the US. The In-
ternational Energy Agency reported a possible 40% improvement in fuel efficiency from available technologies in
2005. See http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/technology-roadmap-fuel-economy-of-road-
vehicles.html.
13The NEDC is also used to determine compliance with the Euronorms that regulate local pollutants such as NOx,
CO, and PM. The Volkswagen scandal was about NOx emissions in diesel vehicles. The fallout of the scandal made
clear that the majority of EU carmakers are not in compliance with Euronorms.
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on-road emissions. The costs of gaming are installing the defeat devices and, more importantly, the
potential legal costs and consumer blow-back when gaming is uncovered. When deciding to game,
firms will trade off these costs against the benefits of cheap compliance. Since firms have opted
to game the regulation, it reveals that firms did not expect these reputation costs to be higher
than the costs of other compliance mechanisms. In the fallout of the VW diesel scandal, the EU
parliament listed dozens of ongoing lawsuits (see: European Parliament Briefing PE 583.793). In
recent years, several other firms have become defendants in claims as it became clear VW was not
the only firm to have gamed the EU emission tests.
Data The main data set is obtained from a market research firm JATO ANALYTICS (2012). It
contains sales and product characteristics for each passenger car sold during 1998-2011 in seven Eu-
ropean countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, The Netherlands, and Spain.14
The characteristics and sales are given for several engine variants of a car model at the country
level with a yearly frequency. The country is the geographical market. A model is defined as
a brand/model name/body type combination (e.g., Volkswagen Golf Hatchback).15 The engine
variants differ in fuel type (gasoline or diesel) and engine performance. Accounting for fuel type
is important in the EU market, as diesel variants have a considerable market share (56% in 2011)
and the emissions of diesel variants are lower; a diesel engine emits approximately 20% less C02.
16
Sales are defined as new vehicle registrations in each of the countries. The prices are the
suggested retail prices (including registration taxes and VAT, as obtained from the European Au-
tomobile Association). The product characteristics give information on the vehicle size (footprint
defined as length by width, weight, and height) and engine performance (horsepower and dis-
placement). The data also contains information on fuel consumption (liters per 100 km and CO2
emissions per km). These numbers are the official consumption ratings obtained from the New
European Driving Cycle (NEDC), a standardized driving cycle to assess the emission levels of car
engines. The cycle simulates both urban and highway driving patterns and excludes the use of
auxiliary features, such as air conditioning. Real-world emissions thus differentiate from these test
values. Reynaert and Sallee (2020), using data from TravelCardNV (2015), develop a measure of
on-road emissions and show that reductions in the official CO2 ratings do not fully translate into
actual savings. Carmakers can calibrate engines with defeat devices and specific software so that
they perform much better on the test. Gaming is defined as improvements that do not translate to
the road. I use the measure of on-road emissions in the analysis to disentangle technology adop-
tion from gaming.17 This information is available for a limited sample of vehicles. Next, I use
production data from PwC Autofacts (2012) that contain the country and plant of production for
each model. I match this with a producer price index and a unit labor cost measure obtained from
14These markets represent approximately 90% of the total EU market.
15The body types are as follows: hatchback, sedan, wagon, coupe, convertible, mini MPV, and SUV.
16The combustion process and different energy content of the fuel make diesel engines more efficient per kilometer.
Diesel cars emit less CO2 per kilometer, but increases emissions of other pollutants such as NOX .
17Reynaert and Sallee (2020) construct on-road emissions from a panel of 12,000 drivers visiting a fuel station 22
million times. Odometer readings and fuel purchases are used to construct fuel consumption on the road.
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the OECD. Finally, I use the data on fuel prices, unit labor costs, GDP/capita, population (from
Datastream International (2012)), and the number of households in each country (from Eurostat
(2012)), to construct the fuel costs for consumers, real prices, and the number of potential buyers
in each year.
To reduce the size of the data, I leave out firms, brands, and models with very low sales. The
analysis will focus on the largest producers and their bestselling brands on the EU market. The
included firms are BMW, Daimler, Fiat, Ford, General Motors, PSA, Renault, and Volkswagen.
I treat the largest Asian car makers, Honda, Hyundai, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Suzuki, and Toyota,
as one decision-maker.18 The list of excluded brands and a detailed description of the data ma-
nipulations are in Appendix A1. In total, I keep 40,239 market/year/model/engine variants in 98
year/countries, or approximately 400 model engine variants per market. The final data contains
80% of the total reported sales in the sample.
Throughout the paper, I split the dataset over time and markets in several ways. In Section 3, I
collapse the data towards a unique model engine variant in each year and leave out the variation over
markets. I use these data to make statements on the evolution of the supply of engine characteristics
in response to the policy and contains 14,444 unique observations. To estimate the structural model,
I rely only on data before the policy announcement and use the years 1998-2007. This exploits
30,000 year/market/model-engine observations. I use the data from the year 2007 as the benchmark
for the simulations in Section 6.
Summary Statistics Figure 1 plots each producer’s distance from the emission standard in
2007 and 2011. Each firm needs to move below the dotted line, which presents the attribute-
based emission standard. In 2007 each firm was far above the target and had the following three
options to reach the standard: reduce emissions, increase vehicle weight, or combine both. The
Asian firms, BMW, Daimler, and Ford, decrease weight and reduce emissions. Volkswagen reduces
emissions while keeping weight constant. Fiat, GM, PSA, and Renault all increase the average
weight slightly while decreasing emissions sharply. I observe a sharp downward trend in emissions
towards the standard for all firms. The decrease in emissions is so strong that most of the firms
comply with the emission standard four years before it is fully binding.19 Table 1 shows the change
in the sales-weighted vehicle characteristics between 2007 and 2011. CO2 emissions decrease by
14% while other characteristics grow moderately. In Appendix Figure A1, I plot the sales-weighted
characteristics over time from 1998 to 2011 for the EU and the US. The most remarkable trend in
the EU is the evolution of CO2 emissions. Sales-weighted emissions are constant until 2002, decline
approximately 6% until 2007, and then plunge by 14% in the last four years of the sample. This
18I combine the fleet of the Asian carmakers because most of these firms do not have a broad product set. This
makes finding a price equilibrium with solely price changes impossible in my algorithms. Alternatively, I could choose
to only keep Toyota and Nissan, by far the largest Asian firms in the EU, but combining all Asian firms allows me
to include more products. Note that the emission standard is sales-based; it does not matter where the vehicle is
produced. This means that imports sold in the EU are counted, and exports are ignored.
19This shows that the emission standard is probably not the only mechanism driving down the sales-weighted
emissions. Below I comment on complementary explanations.
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shift coincides with the announcement of the emission standard by the European Commission. In
the US, emissions decline 3% between 2007 and 2009, but then, in contrast to the EU, emissions
remain constant at 90% of the 1998 level.
Table 1: sales-weighted vehicle characteristics in 2007 and 2011
Characteristics 2007 2011 % Change
CO2 (in g/km) 147 126 -14.3%
Horsepower (in kW) 77 80 3.9%
Footprint (in m2) 7.2 7.4 2.8%
Weight (in kg) 1271 1280 0.7%
Diesel 56% 56% 0.0%
The Table presents the sales-weighted vehicle characteristics in the EU in 2007 and 2011.
3 Market response to the EU emission standard
In this section, I decompose the decrease in carbon emissions in the EU vehicle market. The
goal of the decomposition is to measure the extent to which different abatement strategies can
explain the drop in emissions after the policy announcement. To do this, I estimate a trade-off
relation between emissions and other vehicle characteristics. I decompose the shifts over time in the
correlation between characteristics and official emissions into changes in technology and changes in
the composition of the vehicle fleet. I also investigate to what extent technological change translates
to the road by comparing actual with official emissions.
Estimation of trade-off and technology parameters Following Knittel (2011), I estimate
the following regression:
log(ejy) = ζy + log(xjy)η + εjy, (2)
where ejy are emissions, the technology parameter ζy is a year fixed effect, xjy are characteristics, η
trade off parameters denoting how emissions change with characteristics and εjy is an error term.
20
The technology parameter captures shifts over time in the trade-off between emissions and charac-
teristics. When the trade-off parameters η are constant over time, technology ζy is input neutral
as it enters multiplicative in levels.21 I include vehicle model fixed effects such that the identifying
variation comes from different engine options within the same model. I assume the remaining un-
observable εjy to be i.i.d.. The unobserved error comes from variation in unobserved attributes of
engine versions within a model name, such as torque or the valve mechanism. These unobserved
engine attributes might correlate with explanatory variables, so that η cannot be interpreted as a
20Knittel (2011) assumes that the marginal cost is additively separable in elements related to emissions and other
cost elements not related to emissions. Then this estimation can be interpreted as an estimate of the level set or
iso-marginal cost relation between emissions and its determinants.
21The main specification has a constant η, but I also show robustness when η changes over time. I estimate 2 using
a wide range of robustness checks, which are specified below and reported in Appendix Table A3.
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causal relationship between the characteristics and emissions. The goal of estimating (2) is to see
changes in emissions over time while controlling for the correlation between emissions and other
characteristics.
Table 2: Technological Progress Estimates
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Official Ratings actual Ratings
Coef. St.E. Coef. St.E. Coef. St.E. Coef. St.E. Coef. St.E.
1999 -0.5 0.8 -1.4 0.1 -1.7 1.4 -0.9 0.5 -1.2 0.1
2000 1.9 0.6 2.4 0.1 1.7 0.9 -1.5 0.2 -1.5 0.1
2001 -1.5 0.4 -2.2 0.2 -1.4 0.9 -1.2 0.2 -1.7 0.1
2002 -1.3 0.4 -1.5 0.2 -1.5 0.6 -0.9 0.3 -0.8 0.1
2003 -1.5 0.3 -1.9 0.2 -0.8 0.3 -0.5 0.2 -0.5 0.1
2004 -1.8 0.5 -2.1 0.2 -1.4 0.7 -0.7 0.3 -0.9 0.2
2005 -1.5 0.3 -1.9 0.2 -0.9 0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.1
2006 -1.3 0.3 -1.7 0.1 -1.1 0.5 -0.4 0.2 -0.4 0.1
2007 -1.4 0.6 -2.2 0.1 -0.9 0.9 -0.2 0.5 -0.5 0.1
2008 -2.7 0.4 -3.1 0.1 -2.2 0.8 -0.9 0.4 -0.9 0.0
2009 -3.0 0.6 -3.6 0.1 -3.2 1.0 -1.4 0.5 -1.4 0.1
2010 -4.3 0.7 -4.7 0.1 -5.5 1.6 -2.5 0.5 -1.8 0.0
2011 -3.3 0.4 -4.5 0.1 -3.2 1.1 -1.3 0.6 -1.9 0.1
Difference in Technology Growth 2011-2007 and 2007-1998
Difference 2.3 0.5 2.42 0.07 2.6 0.9 0.8 0.3 0.65 0.08
The Table gives the yearly percentage change in emissions due to technological improvements obtained from
differencing the year fixed effects in (2). The standard errors are computed with the Delta method. Years
after the policy announcement are shaded. Model 2 and Model 5 report the average of firm-specific trends,
Appendix Table A4 reports firm-level estimates.
The estimation of (2) is useful because it reveals the abatement strategies that firms resort to
without relying on a structural model. In Figure 1, I show how emissions starkly decreased after the
regulatory announcement. If firms choose to alter the sales mix or to downsize, then the part of the
emissions that is explained by characteristics xjy should decrease over time. With mix-shifting and
downsizing, firms would sell more small and low performing cars. In contrast, when firms choose to
implement technology, we should see shifts in the technology parameters ζy over time. As discussed
above, firms gaming the test is a concern. This is a concern when estimating (2), as the left-hand-
side variable is the official emission rating obtained from the regulator. To test the extent to which
emissions on the road change, I also estimate (2) using a measure of actual emissions as the left-
hand-side variable. I use the actual emissions constructed in Reynaert and Sallee (2020). Looking
at actual emissions allows me to test if the technological improvements revealed in the official data
translate to on-road measures. I now present estimates of the technology parameters in Table 2
and the decomposition of emissions over time in Table 3. I discuss the trade-off parameters and
robustness in Appendix A2, Table A2 and Table A3.
The technology parameters ζy are derived from the time fixed effects in each regression and
11
are plotted in Table 2 for Models 1 to 5. Model 1 is the baseline specification close to Knittel
(2011), and includes trade-off parameters for horsepower, weight, footprint, and height. Model
2 allows for a firm-specific trend in technology. Next, I start introducing the on-road measures
of emissions. These measures are available for a much smaller set of vehicles so that the sample
shrinks from 14,444 observations to 3,766 observations. Model 3 replicates Model 1 with the smaller
sample. Model 4 changes the dependent variable so that the relation between the actual emissions
and characteristics is estimated. Model 5 introduces firm-specific trends. Models 2 and 5 report
averages of firm-specific trends. The bottom panel of the table presents the difference in the mean
of ζy for 1999-2007 and 2008-2011, corresponding to the pre- and post-policy announcement period.
Models 1-3 all explain the official emission ratings, and I find that technology improves significantly
faster in the later years of the sample. All estimates show that the technology shifts ζy are more
than 2% higher after 2007 than in the years before. The difference is statistically significant. After
2007, the estimates reveal a significant increase in the pace of technology improvement.22 In the
official emission measures, I find evidence of rapid changes in technology adoption, but the emission
reductions might not translate to the road. Once I look at changes in actual emissions in Models 4
and 5, I find that technology growth does not increase as rapidly in the post-policy period. Between
2008-2011, the mean technology change shrinks from 3.9% in Model 2 to a mere 1.5% in Model 5.
However, Models 4 and 5 reveal higher average technology growth in later years relative to prior
years, but the difference shrinks from 2.4% to 0.7%. 23
Overall, this reveals that firms do engage in technology adoption after the policy announcement
but that a large part of the technology aims at reducing official emission ratings rather than actual
emissions. The estimates show that 70% of the additional reduction in official emissions comes
from gaming, while 30% comes from actual technology improvements. I will use this 30/70 ratio in
the structural model below.24
Decomposition of the changes in emissions I use the estimated relation (2) to decompose
the decline in emissions over time. The decomposition is as follows: I predict emissions, êjy, as the
fitted values of regression (2) with Model 2. I also predict ejy using (2) but fixing the technology
level at ζy = ζ2007.
25 The evolution in the sales-weighted values of ejy only changes when the
composition of characteristics xjy changes over time, while êjy changes both because of underlying
characteristics and technology.
The results in Table 3 show that between 1998 and 2007, sales-weighted emissions without
22Table ?? reports firm-specific trends with similar patterns except for BMW and Renault. All firms change the
trend of technology adoption, but the magnitude of the change differs. BMW and Renault have the lowest difference
in technology growth (0.9% and 0.8%), while Volkswagen has the highest difference (5.4%).
23Table ?? presents further robustness checks with official emission decreases estimated to be between 2.1% and
3.3% more rapid after the policy announcement.
24I use the market level estimate of gaming rather than the firm level in the structural model for two reasons. First,
the firm-level estimates are not statistically precise, and introducing firm heterogeneity in gaming creates substantial
differences in welfare outcomes between firms. The second reason is that Reynaert and Sallee (2020), based on a
extended period of data until 2015, find that all firms game in large and similar amounts.
25I re-scale each of the predicted emissions with the attribute-based target function, such that the numbers are
actual distances from the regulation. Not re-scaling gives similar results.
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Table 3: Decomposing the Decrease in Emissions
All Vehicles Existing Models (2007≤) New Models (> 2007)
No Tech. Tech. No Tech. Tech. No Tech. Tech.
True ejy êjy ejy êjy ejy êjy
1998 169 156 172 156 172
1999 168 156 170 156 170
2000 169 155 171 155 171
2001 167 154 169 154 169
2002 164 154 166 154 166
2003 161 153 162 153 162
2004 158 152 159 152 159
2005 156 152 157 152 157
2006 154 152 155 152 155
2007 151 152 152 152 152
2008 147 152 147 151 147 157 152
2009 142 152 143 152 142 160 150
2010 135 152 136 152 136 154 137
2011 130 152 130 152 130 154 132
The Table reports the observed and predicted levels of the average sales-weighted CO2 emissions corrected
with the attribute function f(wj) to represent the target values of the regulation. All predictions use the
estimates from Table ?? and Table 2 Model 2. The columns ejy contain sales-weighted predicted emissions
keeping technology constant at ζy = ζ2007. The columns êjy contain sales-weighted predicted values for
emissions with estimated ζy.
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technology ejy declined slightly from 156 to 152. Technology improvements are responsible for the
remaining moderate decline in official emissions between 1998 and 2007. After 2007, the sales-
weighted emissions without technology ejy remain constant. Because ejy is constant, mix-shifting
or downsizing cannot explain the decline in official emissions. When I split up the average sales-
weighted emissions into vehicle models released after and before 2007, the results show that the
emissions ejy of vehicles released before 2007 remain constant.
26 Vehicle models released after
the policy announcement are, on average, more polluting than the existing vehicle models. The
difference between the existing vehicles and the vehicles released after the policy decreases over
time. The observed decline in emissions is not attributable to changes in the sales mix or the
release of new downsized fuel-efficient vehicles. However, I cannot rule out that the vehicles would
have grown in terms of weight, size, and horsepower without the policy.
The sales-weighted emissions with technology êjy are decreasing rapidly after 2007, and this
shows that technology adoption is fully responsible for the observed drop in the official emission
ratings. Strikingly, the decrease in sales-weighted emissions of older vehicles due to technology is
as strong as the decrease in newly released vehicles and engine improvements are installed widely
across the fleet.
These results present two concerns so far. First, the Great Recession and the EU debt crisis took
place just after the policy announcement. In general, an economic downturn would lead consumers
to spend less on durables and would add to the likelihood of finding evidence for shifts in the
composition of the fleet towards smaller vehicles. The fact that we do not see this strengthens
the argument that firms respond with technology adoption. Technology adoption itself could be
affected by the crisis, but the direction of that effect is unclear. A second concern is that the
observed response is so strong that most firms already complied with the emission standard in
2011, four years before the regulation is fully binding. Individual member states do increase their
emission-based taxation and regulation in response to the EU-wide policy.27 This combination of
new local taxation and the standard can explain why the response is so strong and why compliance
is attained early. It would be very interesting to study the interaction between national regulation
and the EU-wide standard, but this is out of the scope of the current project. In the remaining
analysis, I model firm behavior in response to a standard to single out the effects of the EU emission
standard.
In summary, I present evidence that the observed decline in emissions is attributable to changes
in the official CO2 ratings while the sales mix and characteristics of the fleet are unaffected. The
estimates show that gaming explains 70% of the decline in official emissions, technology adaption
explains the remaining 30%. These findings form the basis for developing an economic model in
which firms can respond to the emission standard with technology adoption or gaming, keeping the
other characteristics of their fleet unaffected.
26An example of a newly released model is the ‘Citroen DS3 Hatchback’, released in 2009.




This section introduces an emission standard in a structural model of consumer demand and firm
behavior. The supply-side model describes how firms can use different abatement strategies in
response to a binding emission standard. This model will be the basis to simulate the welfare
effects of the emission standard in Section 6. In the estimation, I use pre-policy data to estimate a
standard supply model in which firms do not face the regulatory constraint. Finally, I discuss how
the design choices of the regulator regarding attribute basing and enforcement affect abatement
choices.28
Demand A market is defined as a country, indexed by m, observed in a calendar year y.29 In
each market my there are Amy potential consumers. Consumers are assumed to purchase only in
the market where they are located. Each consumer i chooses one alternative j, which is either the
outside good, j = 0, or one of the J differentiated products, j = 1, . . . , J . Consumer i’s conditional
indirect utility for the outside good is ui0my = εi0my, and for products j = 1, . . . , J it is:
uijmy = xjmyβ
x
i − βei djmyejmykj − αpjmy + ξjmy + εijmy, (3)
where xjmy is a vector of observed product characteristics, djmyejmykj are fuel costs (fuel prices
djmy times emissions ejmy times a fuel type specific factor kj that translates emissions into fuel
consumption as explained in footnote 1), pjmy is the vehicle price and ξjmy is an unobserved
characteristic of vehicle j in market my, unobserved by the researcher but observed by consumers
and firms. The parameter vector (βei , β
x
i ) consists of random coefficients, capturing individual-
specific valuations for fuel costs and vehicle characteristics, α is the marginal utility of income or
price valuation and εijmy is a remaining individual-specific valuation for product j (assumed to be
i.i.d. type I extreme value). The random coefficient for characteristic k is given by βki = β
k +σkνki ,
where νki is a random draw from a standard normal distribution so that β
k represents the mean
valuation for characteristic k and σk the standard deviation across consumers.
The coefficient βei measures the consumers’ valuation of fuel costs. Consumers use vehicles for
several years and care about the expected fuel costs over the vehicle lifetime. I follow the literature
on fuel cost valuation (see, for example, Allcott and Wozny (2014) and Grigolon, Reynaert, and
Verboven (2018)) and make the assumption that consumers expect fuel prices to follow a random
walk. The random walk assumption is consistent with the survey evidence, as shown by Anderson,
Kellogg, and Sallee (2013). The fuel price at the time of purchase multiplied by the vehicle fuel
consumption then captures the expected cost per kilometer of travel in each year of usage. The
parameter βei estimates the mean and heterogeneity in the value for fuel costs scaled by mileage and
28The abatement strategies discussed do not need to occur mutually exclusively. Firms choose their abatement
strategies such that the marginal abatement costs of each strategy are equal. When firms abate by choosing only one
strategy, the marginal cost of that strategy must be lower than that of the other strategies.
29The geographical market corresponds to a country in the empirical analysis because I observe prices and quantities
at the country level.
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a capitalization factor.30,31 I estimate the valuation for fuel costs with data from before the policy
announcement where firms had no incentive to game.32 I assume that consumers know what the
official rating signals about the actual fuel costs when estimating the model. When I introduce the
policy in the simulation, firms can game the emission ratings and it becomes unclear if consumers
can determine if decreases in fuel costs are due to gaming or technology adoption. I consider both
the case where consumers are sophisticated and where they are fooled.
Each consumer i in market my chooses the alternative j = 0, . . . , J that maximizes her utility.
The predicted market share of vehicle j in market my is the probability that product j yields
the highest utility across all available products (including the outside good 0). This is given by




exp(δjmy + µjmy(σ, ν))
1 +
∑J
l=1 exp(δlmy + µlmy(σ, ν))
dPν(ν), (4)
where δmy, the mean utility, which collects all terms in (3) that do not vary across individuals,






jmy. To complete the demand side, I set the observed market share
sjmy = qjmy/Amy equal to the predicted market share (4). In vector notation, the demand side in
market m can then be described by the market share system as follows: smy = smy(δmy, σ).
Firm Behavior To study firms’ responses to the emission standard, I model a game in which
firms have the following three choices: price setting, technology adoption, and gaming. The timing
of the game is assumed to be as follows. First, I assume that the vehicle fleet of firms is exogenous.
Each firm sells hundreds of differentiated products and I do not model the decision regarding which
vehicles firms choose to offer. Second, at the time of their strategic decision, firms have perfect
information on all observable and unobservable characteristics. Third, given their vehicle fleet, firms
have the option to change the prices and fuel consumption of each of the products simultaneously.
The fuel consumption can be changed by adding technology or by gaming the test that determines
the level of fuel consumption. Finally, when firms face regulation, the choices are altered to comply
with the regulation that binds across total sales from all EU markets. The goal of this section is
to understand how firms change decisions on pricing and fuel consumption levels when facing a
binding regulation.
30The total expected fuel costs can be written as E[
∑S
s=1(1+r)
−smidsejkj ] where s=1 is the time of purchase, S is
the time of scrappage, r is the interest rate and m is mileage. Using the random walk assumption for g, we can write
expected fuel costs as ρmid1ejkj , with ρ being the capitalization coefficient. See Grigolon, Reynaert, and Verboven
(2018) for a detailed discussion. In the utility specification in (3) βei absorbs ρmi.
31The specification does not allow consumers to care about emissions (a ’green glow’ effect) separately. These
preferences might be captured by the standard deviation in tastes for fuel costs as green consumers value fuel costs
more than others.
32In Reynaert and Sallee (2020), we show that the gap between the official and on-road ratings was constant up
until 2007. We expect a gap between lab and on-road ratings because driving circumstances differ.
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where πfm are variable profits for firm f in market m, Ff is the set of products firm f sells, κ
is the level of the standard and f(wj) is the attribute basing on weight wj . For a flat standard
f(wj) = 0, when f(wj) 6= 0 vehicles with different weights obtain reductions or penalties on their
official emissions.33 I model technology adoption and gaming as percentage reductions in fuel
consumption so that 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, 0 ≤ g ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ t + g ≤ 1. Firms adjusting t or g induce
sunk costs C(t, g), which I discuss in Section 6. I model simultaneous joint choices of p, t and g
and ignore dynamics.34 I follow Goldberg (1998) and Jacobsen (2013) and write the Lagrangian of






[(pjm − cjm(tj)− λLj(tj , gj))sjm(p, t, g)Am], (6)
where cjm denotes marginal costs, λ is the shadow cost of the regulation per unit of sales. The
shadow cost is multiplied by Lj = (1 − tj − gj)ej − f(wj) − κ, the distance of each product from
the target. When Lj < 0 (> 0), an additional sale of vehicle j brings the average sales-weighted
emissions closer to (further away from) the target. The shadow cost λ gives the cost per unit sold
of deviating one unit from the standard. If the standard is non-binding, λ = 0 and (6) reduces
to a standard multi-product profit function. The shadow cost λ takes the same value for each
vehicle in the fleet Ff because, in equilibrium, firms equalize the shadow costs over their fleet to
be cost-efficient. The shadow cost differs between firms because trading of excess emissions is not
allowed.
Three first-order derivatives of L to p, t, g, together with sunk cost, determine the optimal solu-
tion to the profit maximization problem. I introduce the following matrices to write the derivatives
concisely: Φ denotes a J × J ownership matrix with each element (i, j) equal to one if i and j are
owned by the same firm and zero otherwise; 4k denotes the J × J matrix of first-order derivatives
of market shares with respect to k = p, t or g. Define ◦ as the Hadamard product. Bold vectors
(q,p, c, λ ◦ L and e) have dimension J × 1, with λ now a vector with the firm-specific shadow cost
when jεFf . Vector c
′
t is J × 1 with scalar derivatives ∂mcj/∂tj as elements. The J first-order
33I specify the attribute basing as a simple additive penalty or reduction, but one could design a regulation where
the target is any function g(ejm, wjm) of emissions and the attribute.
34In reality, firms choose to incrementally adopt technology and gaming over several years between the policy
announcement and enforcement. In ignoring this process, I miss how firms could make strategic abatement choices
that take into account the path dependency of their choices.
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derivatives with respect to prices, technology, and gaming are:
∂L
∂p
= q + Φ ◦ 4p(p− c− λ ◦ L) (7)
∂L
∂t
= (−c′t + λ ◦ e) ◦ q + Φ ◦ 4t(p− c− λ ◦ L) (8)
∂L
∂g
= λ ◦ e ◦ q + Φ ◦ 4g(p− c− λ ◦ L) (9)
The first-order derivatives with respect to prices show the standard trade off between increases
in mark up (first term on the right-hand side) and losses from reduced sales (second term on the
right-hand side) when increasing the price. The first-order derivatives with respect to technology
adoption show that firms trade-off marginal cost increases c′t with relaxing the regulatory constraint
and the benefits of increased market share (we expect 4t > 0). The first-order derivatives with
respect to gaming are very similar but gaming induces no marginal cost changes. The system is
defined at the product level for t and g. In the counterfactual, I impose g because I lack cost data
and I solve for firm level choices of t to shrink the dimensionality of (8) to the number of firms.
Externalities The regulation limits the sales-weighted emissions and not the total externalities
from the new vehicle fleet. The amount of CO2 emitted depends on both the size and composition
of the fleet. Given the fuel consumption of each vehicle, we can compute the total lifetime damages
from CO2 emissions. The computation requires information on mileage and an estimate of the
value of a ton of CO2. When consumers purchase vehicles with lower fuel consumption, emissions
decrease. However, it might be that the standard results in more fuel-efficient vehicles but also in
more purchases. It is not certain that total emissions will decline. In the welfare calculation, I also
consider other externalities, such as traffic, accidents, and local pollutants.
Next, I discuss how equilibrium outcomes change when we move from a market without a
standard (or a nonbinding standard), λ = 0 to a market with a binding standard, λ > 0. The
changes in the market depend on the abatement strategy of firms, i.e., mix-shifting, technology
adoption, or gaming. I discuss the effect of each strategy in turn, keeping the other strategies fixed.
Abatement by mix-shifting A first mechanism to abate emissions is to change the relative
prices of high and low emission vehicles. Firms can decrease the prices of vehicles with emissions
below the target (Lj < 0) while increasing the prices of vehicles with emissions above the target
(Lj > 0). The first-order conditions with respect to prices (7) show that the shadow cost of the
regulation, λ, determines to what extent prices will be distorted from a no-policy equilibrium, as
follows:
p = c + λ ◦ L− (Φ ◦ 4p)−1q (10)
The regulation implicitly taxes vehicles with Lj > 0, while it implicitly subsidizes vehicles with
Lj < 0. This change in the relative prices of products shifts the sales mix towards vehicles with
lower fuel consumption. It is important to stress that the abatement strategy of changing prices
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to shift the sales mix is driven by the term λ ◦ L. This term captures the first-order effect of
the regulation on prices and shows how the emission target constrains the pricing equilibrium.
Abatement by technology adoption and gaming, as discussed immediately below, results in changes
in attributes of different products. These changes also affect pricing, as firms face different marginal
costs and competition. But, I do not interpret these price changes as mix-shifting.
The incidence and effectiveness of this abatement strategy largely depend on the responsiveness
of consumers to these price changes as captured in 4p. Holland, Hughes, and Knittel (2009) show
that when the price elasticities of subsidized products differ from those of taxed products, total
sales and emissions might increase or decrease. Without knowledge of the own and cross-price
elasticities, we cannot make statements about the effect of the regulation on sales, emissions or
consumer surplus. The effects on profits depend on consumers response to price changes but also
depend on the position of the fleet relative to the target. Firms with a fleet that is better adapted
to the standard might increase profits, as their prices need less distortion than their competitors.
The empirical mode allows me to identify the own and cross-price elasticities for all products and
to simulate the shifts in sales when I introduce a binding regulation.
Abatement by technology adoption Firms can reduce the emissions of existing vehicles by
adapting the engines, the combustion process, or features that only affect fuel consumption. From
(8), we see that the regulation gives incentives to firms to adopt more technology. The first term,
(−c′t + λ ◦ e) ◦ q, specifies that increases in fuel efficiency change the marginal cost of each unit
sold. But, the technology also relaxes the regulatory constraint, resulting in a marginal benefit of
λ. Without a regulation λ = 0 and the marginal benefits of technology adoption is lower. The
second term captures the change in sales from technology, Φ ◦ 4t, multiplied by profits per unit,
(p− c− λ ◦ L). Finally, implementing technology can involve sunk costs C(t, g) related to making
changes in the production.
Each unit of technology adoption lowers L. The fleet of the firm shifts closer to the regulatory
target and the regulatory constraint is relaxed. Technology adoption reduces the shadow cost of
the regulation λ as firms need less distortion away from the preferred price schedule to comply.
When determining to what extent firms adopt technology or mix-shift in equilibrium, the shadow
cost λ and the amount of technology is determined endogenously.
The welfare effects of this strategy are again undetermined theoretically. Consumer face two
offsetting effects. The standard puts upward pressure on prices as marginal costs increase with
c′t. Increased prices reduce consumer surplus. However, offsetting this, firms offer vehicles with
lower fuel consumption, decreasing the cost of operating a vehicle. The sum of the purchase price
and operating costs might increase or decrease. Even though the resulting vehicle fleet has lower
emissions, it is not clear that emissions decrease, i.e., if consumers benefit from technology, they
might purchase more vehicles. The changes in marginal costs and the degree of pass-through
determine the overall effect. Given that different vehicles have different fuel consumptions, the
equilibrium prices also adjust, creating another welfare change for consumers. For firms, technology
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adoption is a preferred abatement strategy if the shadow cost of mix-shifting is high, and the
marginal cost and sunk cost changes of technology adoption are low.
Abatement by gaming Gaming helps with compliance in a very similar way as technology
adoption. The first part of (9) shows each unit of gaming reduces L and the shadow cost of
the regulation λ until firms can price without regulatory constraints. The second term in (9)
accounts for market share changes due to gaming. Gaming does not affect the on-road experience of
consumers and does not reduce the actual fuel consumption. However, when purchasing a vehicle,
consumers might be fooled by the advertised fuel consumption. The EU introduced the official
ratings for advertising and windshield stickers to inform consumers about fuel costs and pollution.
As such, gaming has demand effects that distort consumer choice. In the results, I discuss what
happens when consumers are fooled or when they are aware of gaming. The effects on consumer
welfare depend on this consumer sophistication. If consumers do not see through gaming, the
information in the official ratings becomes a noisy signal of fuel costs and might distort consumer
choices. This choice distortion reduces consumer surplus and might also lead to higher prices.
Gaming might also have positive effects for consumers, as it allows firms to avoid costly compliance
and high pricing. The effects on emissions from gaming can be pervasive. Each reduction in fuel
consumption obtained with gaming does not reduce actual emissions. Consumers respond to the
decreases in perceived fuel costs by substituting toward higher-performance cars. Because cars
look cheaper on paper, the overall sales might increase. Both of these effects potentially increase
emissions relative to honest compliance.
The costs of gaming are very different than those of technology adoption. As summarized in
Section 2, gaming is essentially a sunk cost that mainly consists of expected legal fees and consumer
blow-back. This cost C(t, g) needs to be positive to prevent firms from choosing for gaming as the
only abatement strategy. Both terms in (9) are benefits to the firm, and these benefits will be
weighted against the expected costs. Without empirical information on C(t, g), I choose to pin
down gaming using the evidence from Section 3.
Abatement by downsizing I assume the fleet of each firm as given. In previous work, Klier and
Linn (2012) and Whitefoot, Fowlie, and Skerlos (2017) tried to relax this assumption by modeling
not only improvements in fuel consumption but by allowing firms to optimize a broader set of
attributes. This strategy is described as downsizing: firms reduce the size and power of vehicles to
lower fuel consumption. Klier and Linn (2012) find that compliance costs decrease by approximately
40% per year when firms downsize instead of changing prices. Consumer loss is similar. Whitefoot,
Fowlie, and Skerlos (2017) use an interesting engineering model. I do not model downsizing for two
reasons. In Section 3, I find no evidence of downsizing in the EU. A model that allows strategic
choices over several characteristics is computationally challenging for the detailed engine version
level data used in this analysis, and it would introduce difficulties with multiple equilibria.
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Design of emission standards One of the key contributions of this paper is to show how
political choices about the design features of emission standards interact with the firms’ abatement
choices. In the counterfactual, I consider two regulation design choices. First, I study the EU’s
choice to have a policy that is attribute-based and upward sloping, as depicted in Figure 1. Second,
I study the implications of weak enforcement of the regulation.
It is instructive to compare the attribute-based regulation with a flat standard. For a flat
standard, L′j = [ej − κ′], and f(wj) = 0. The target function is a horizontal line at κ′ and all
firms need to reach the same level of sales-weighted emissions. Each firm has a different set of
vehicles with Lj < 0 and L
′
j < 0. Because of the upward sloping ABR in the EU, the sales of
many small, lightweight vehicles do not help with compliance, while they help with compliance
under a flat standard. Attribute basing reduces the number of products that have Lj < 0. Price
changes become much costlier because firms have can shift sales to fewer products. Reducing
fuel consumption by technology adoption or gaming helps increase the number of products that
have emissions underneath the target. In the empirical section, I show that the ABR increases
the stringency for French and Italian firms but reduces the stringency for German firms. The
difference between firms matches the lobbying efforts by the governments described at the time of
the negotiations. I also show that price changes became so expensive for firms that they had to
resort to lowering fuel consumption.
The attribute-based regulation might have other economic consequences. Ito and Sallee (2018)
point out that attribute-based standards distort the demand and supply of the attribute itself. If
heavier cars help with attaining the target, weight is indirectly subsidized, and producers choose
to add more weight to their vehicles.35 In this exercise, I keep the weight fixed and assume no
distortions in the attribute itself. I keep weight fixed because I do not observe any changes in
weight consistent with a distortion. Additionally, allowing for more choice variables for the firm is
computationally costly.
The EU’s political structure has also led to weak enforcement of the policy. Above, I discussed
how failures in the delegation of enforcement have led to the gaming crisis in the EU market.
Theoretically, the sunk cost of gaming C(g) captures enforcement. When enforcement is strict and
legal punishment for gaming high, the sunk costs of gaming increases. A higher sunk cost means
that gaming as an abatement strategy becomes less attractive so firms resort to mix-shifting or
technology adoption. In the empirical section, I discuss what happens if firms do not game EU
regulation.
5 Estimation
I use a panel of 7 countries over 10 years to estimate the taste and cost parameters. I restrict
the sample to 1998-2007, the years before the policy announcement. This restriction allows me
to estimate a model in which firms maximize unconstrained profits as given in (6) with λ = 0.
35This creates distortions, which might be significant if weight is associated with other external costs. See the
analysis by Anderson and Auffhammer (2014) relating weight to accident risk.
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It also allows me to estimate the consumer valuation of fuel costs before firms start to game
emission ratings. I discuss the demand estimation that allows for the endogeneity of both prices
and engine characteristics. Next, I discuss the supply-side and estimation of costs. I also discuss the
functional form assumptions needed to project marginal costs out of sample to model technological
improvements. With the estimates of consumer preferences, marginal costs, and the functional
form assumption, I simulate the impact of the emission standard in the next section.
Demand Estimation The vector of parameters θ to be estimated consists of the taste parameters
βei , β
x
i and αi. I estimate both a mean and a standard deviation of the taste for fuel consumption,
horsepower, and a dummy for foreign perceived cars (e.g., a BMW in France). I specify α to be
proportional to income ym in market m, so that α = αmy = α/ymy.
36 I add a set of controls
for which I only estimate the mean taste. These include weight, footprint, height, a dummy for 3
doors, market fixed effects, diesel by market interactions, months on market dummies (for vehicles
introduced within a calendar year), and a market-specific time trend.37 Finally, I add 331 fixed
effects on the vehicle model level so that all identifying variation for the taste parameters comes
from different engine versions within the same vehicle model. The remaining unexplained variation
in market shares is ξjm. I obtain the parameters by minimizing the GMM criterion:
min
θ
ξ (θ)′ ZAZ ′ξ (θ) (11)
where ξ is a column vector of the J demand unobservables stacked over each market. I obtain ξ
after inverting the system of market shares in (4). The matrix of instruments is Z, and A is a
weighting matrix. I use the two-step efficient GMM estimator so that the second step A is the
estimate of the optimal weighting matrix. I follow the estimation algorithm described in Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Nevo (2001). I take into account recent cautionary warnings and
improvements and carefully check the properties of the obtained minimum.38
A common exclusion restriction in the literature is E[ξ|x] = 0, so that any function of observed
characteristics is a valid candidate to form the unconditional moments. This exclusion restriction
allows for the correlation between prices and ξ but assume that all the vehicle characteristic choices
of firms are mean independent of ξ. The counterfactual considers strategic choices in response to
36This specification allows wealthier markets to be less price elastic. When prices are small relative to the household
budget over the lifetime of the durable good, this approximates an indirect utility function with log(y − pj) as an
argument as in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). See Griffith, Nesheim, and O’Connell (2018) for a discussion on
how the functional form of the indirect utility in price and income matters for distributional effects of price changes.
37I introduce random coefficients on 3 variables that capture important margins on which I expect consumer
heterogeneity to matter. Height, weight, and footprint do not have a random coefficient because the identification
of multiple random coefficients proved impossible with multiple endogenous characteristics. The remaining variables
try to control for market or time level shifts and seem less fit to be candidates to model individual heterogeneity.
38More specifically: (i) I use a nested-fixed point (NFP) algorithm, BLP’s contraction mapping with a tight
convergence criterion (1e-12) to solve for ξjm. I compute the contraction mapping in parallel per market, (ii) I re-
estimate the model with 25 different starting values for the nonlinear parameters, (iii) I check first and second-order
conditions at the obtained minimum, (iv) I use the Interior/Direct algorithm of Knitro, (v) I compute the integral
over individual market shares using sparse grids, see Heiss and Winschel (2008), (vi) I estimate the variances of the
random coefficients rather than the standard deviations, see Ketz (Forthcoming).
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regulation. However, even before the regulation, firms design products to maximize profits. The
concern when estimating demand is that firms know more about consumer tastes than the econo-
metrician when designing the product. This information asymmetry potentially introduces omitted
variable bias through correlation of the demand unobservable ξ and product characteristics, despite
the rich set of fixed effects. To account for this, I introduce additional instrumental variables. The
identification assumption is E[ξ|Zk] = 0 so that the demand unobservables are mean independent
from instruments z. I construct instruments for three sets of parameters: the taste parameter for
the price, the taste parameters for endogenous characteristics, and the nonlinear parameters. First,
I consider instruments Z1 for the model with price endogeneity. Second, I consider instruments Z2
for the more general case with endogenous characteristics.
Instruments The instrument set Z1 contains all characteristics and demand shifters, except
price, as included instruments. The excluded instruments are the sums of other product character-
istics (both the sum across all competing firms’ products and the sum across products of the same
firm). These are valid instruments for prices only when the characteristics are mean independent
of the demand unobservable ξj . Using the location where each vehicle is produced, I include the
logarithm of local labor costs in the country of production as a cost shifter.
For instrument set Z2, I follow the recent work by Whitefoot, Fowlie, and Skerlos (2017), who
use engineering procedures to distinguish between fixed vehicle characteristics and more mutable
characteristics. More mutable characteristics can be adjusted when information about the demand
unobservable is revealed, while fixed characteristics are chosen before and cannot be adjusted. In
the first engineering step, firms set the dimensions of the vehicle (footprint and height). In following
steps, firms fit the engines in the design. I assume that the footprint and height are exogenous and
remain in the set of included instruments. Fuel costs, horsepower, and weight are allowed to be
endogenous so that I need excluded instruments for the following four variables: the three mutable
characteristics and prices.
Because the mutable characteristics potentially correlate with ξ, their sums (across own or
other firm products) are not valid instruments anymore. I form additional instruments that aim
to capture variations in the engine design decisions of firms. Using global production data, I
exploit changes in the exposure of each vehicle model to non-EU markets over time. I compute the
share of each vehicle model produced in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, North America, and South
America. Together with the EU production, the shares add up to one. These production shares
evolve within a model over time as some models become popular in the US (e.g., the BMW X5)
or in China (e.g., the AUDI A8). A vehicle designed for the EU and the US market is different
than a model designed for the EU and China. Because of the vehicle fixed effects, the identifying
variation of the IV’s comes from the trend in globalization within vehicle models. I assume that
the differences in exposure to other markets impact the design choices but are orthogonal to the
EU unobserved demand ξjm. In the production data, I also observe a size variable, scaled from
1 to 10, for each vehicle produced. Using these observations, I compute a weighted sum of size
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for each model and brand. The weights are the production shares in the different continents, and
the size is the production weighted average size of all vehicles produced in a region. These sums
capture competition in product space in different production regions. Next, I follow Klier and Linn
(2012) and include the average footprint and height of vehicles produced in different classes but
on the same production platform. For example, the AUDI A5, which is in the luxury class, is
produced on the same platform, named MLB, as the AUDI Q5, an SUV. I use the attributes of the
Q5 as an instrument for the A5 and vice versa. The idea behind the instrument is that vehicles
produced on the same platform share both fixed and mutable characteristics.39 Finally, fuel costs
equal fuel prices times fuel consumption. Fuel prices are exogenous, so I interact with fuel prices
the projection of fuel consumption on all instruments.
To improve the efficiency of the estimates of the variances of the random coefficients, I compute
approximate optimal instruments for the nonlinear parameters following the approach described
in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1999) and Reynaert and Verboven (2014). These instruments are
nonlinear functions of the previously described included and excluded instruments and relate to
the conditional expectation of the Jacobian of ξjm: E[
∂ξjm
∂σ | zjm]. To approximate the infeasible
optimal instruments, I take a two-stage approach. In the first stage, I estimate the nonlinear model
and compute the approximate optimal instrument at a guess for the nonlinear parameters. In the
second stage, I update the approximation of the optimal instruments at the first stage estimates.40
This procedure generates a number of additional instruments equal to the number of standard
deviations of random coefficients. Appendix A3 gives a detailed overview of all the instrumental
variables.
Costs I do not observe marginal costs cjm but obtain them from the first-order conditions of the
firms’ profit maximization. From equation (7), the demand estimates, and the fact that λ = 0 in
the estimation sample, I compute cjm. Similarly, we can use equation (8) to back out an estimate
of the cost of changing technology c′t. The derivative gives an estimate of the slope of the marginal
cost with respect to reductions in fuel consumption before the policy announcement. Information
on c′t is useful because it reveals the cost changes that firms are willing to incur to provide fuel
consumption in their products. Lowering fuel consumption further would be more costly than what
the firm gains from providing the improvement. If the supply model is correctly specified, any cost
function for further reductions in emissions must start at c′t=0, otherwise, it is at odds with the
revealed choices of firms and consumers. I interpret the pre-policy estimate of the slope as c′t=0 and
use it as the intercept for the cost slope in the simulations.41
I also need an estimate of the cost changes when the regulation requires fuel consumption
39Klier and Linn (2012) include all the characteristics of different class vehicles on the same platform. Their
exclusion restriction related to characteristics is specific to vehicle classes. I allow the exclusion restriction to be more
general and include only the footprint and height in the computation of this instrument.
40The initial point for nonlinear parameters in the first stage approximate optimal instrument is the Logit taste
parameter divided by 10. I compute the approximated optimal IV at ξ = 0 and use projections of the endogenous
variables on the included and excluded instruments in the computation, see Reynaert and Verboven (2014).
41The counterfactual results also consider a case where we start from another intercept below the estimated one.
Market failures in technology adoption are a reason for the actual slope to be smaller than the estimated c′t=0.
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reductions above what we observe. I use two approaches for this problem. The first approach relies
on cost estimates from TNO (2011) that specify convex cost functions for percentage reductions in
emissions. I use these functions in the main results and I refer to them as the engineering cost curve.
However, I shift the intercept of the engineering cost function from zero to the point where the
slope of the engineering function equals c′t=0. Appendix A5 discusses the engineering cost function
in detail.




d + ωjm, (12)
where xjm is a 1×L vector of observed product characteristics, market controls, fixed effects on the
vehicle model level, and cost shifters, and ωjm is unobserved. Fuel consumption enters the marginal
cost, as all else equal, it is likely more expensive to produce engines with lower fuel consumption.
The estimated parameter on emissions informs how marginal costs change with changes in ejm.
The functional form allows me to predict the costs of further reductions in fuel consumption that I
cannot observe within the sample. I estimate (12) by OLS when I derive costs from the RC Logit
model with price endogeneity. When fuel consumption, horsepower, and weight are endogenous in
the demand, ωjm is potentially correlated with these attributes. I instrument the attributes when
estimating (12) using an instrument set Z2
′
that includes the same instruments as Z2 except for
the instruments based on platform as these might capture cost synergies between vehicles.42
Estimation Results Table 4 reports the estimated parameters and standard errors for the de-
mand model. The table presents four specifications. The first two specifications assume exogenous
characteristics and use instrument set Z1 in both Logit and a RC Logit. The last two specifications
allow for endogenous characteristics and use instrument set Z2. Appendix Table A5 reports the
first stage. When prices are the sole endogenous variable, the excluded IV’s are strong and have an
F statistic of 67. The labor cost instrument has the expected positive sign. With multiple endoge-
nous variables, the instruments are weaker with F stats that account for the multiple endogenous
variables being between 5.7 and 21.2.
The demand parameters for the model with endogenous prices show that consumers dislike
higher prices, higher fuel costs, and cars perceived as foreign (BMW in France). Consumers prefer
vehicles that are more powerful, heavier, and larger. In the RC Logit, the standard deviations on
horsepower and foreign show considerable variation in the taste for horsepower and weight. The
estimates change when I allow for multiple endogenous characteristics. The price coefficient de-
creases from -6.7 to -8.1, while the fuel cost parameter increases from -2.6 to -1.2. These coefficients
matter for the welfare simulations, i.e., when consumers care less about fuel costs relative to price,
they derive lower utility from technologies that drive up costs to decrease fuel costs. The remaining
coefficients have larger standard errors than in the model with only price endogeneity, and the
42The cost shifter is an included variable in (12) and not an excluded instrument when estimating the supply. See
Appendix A3 for an overview of the instruments.
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Table 4: Estimation Results
Demand Estimates
Price Endog. (Z1) Charact. Endog. (Z2)
Logit RC Logit Logit RC Logit
Est. St. Err. Est. St. Err. Est. St. Err. Est. St. Err.
Price/Inc. -6.709 0.365 -6.476 0.325 -8.074 0.569 -8.452 0.694
Fuel Cost -2.649 0.120 -2.842 0.127 -1.291 0.192 -1.036 0.269
Horsepower 2.889 0.227 1.232 0.152 3.868 0.673 -1.546 0.760
Weight 0.666 0.181 1.248 0.156 -6.130 2.143 1.530 1.300
Base 0.580 0.056 0.526 0.051 1.499 0.229 0.878 0.179
Height 0.183 0.041 0.215 0.037 0.477 0.091 0.291 0.060
Foreign -0.848 0.023 -1.218 0.043 -0.698 0.042 -0.973 0.060
Standard Deviations
Fuel Cost 0.000 0.033 1.196 0.484
Horsepower 1.604 0.272 2.878 2.445
Foreign 1.276 0.192 0.897 0.185
Marginal Cost Estimates
Perf.Comp. Imp.Comp. Imp.Comp.
Fuel Cons. -0.027 0.001 -0.047 0.001 -0.031 0.027
Horsepower 0.629 0.005 0.690 0.006 -0.390 0.174
Weight 0.742 0.009 0.682 0.011 4.051 0.408
Base 0.070 0.002 0.028 0.002 -0.326 0.056
Height -0.019 0.001 0.053 0.001 -0.101 0.018
Log Labor Cost 0.386 0.003 0.042 0.004 0.140 0.066
The table reports the estimated parameters for the demand and marginal cost equations. The first two
columns in the Demand Estimates give Logit and RC Logit estimates for the model with endogenous prices
and instrument set Z1. The last two columns give the Logit and RC Logit for the model with endogenous
prices and characteristics and instrument set Z2. The first column gives Marginal Cost estimates for perfect
competition (regression of price on characteristics). Columns two and three give marginal cost estimates
under the assumption of a Nash Bertrand game in prices (imperfect competition). Column three instruments




mean tastes for horsepower and weight switch sign between the Logit and RC Logit estimate. The
standard deviations show considerable heterogeneity in the taste for fuel costs, horsepower, and
foreign vehicles in this case. In Appendix Table A6, I discuss the fit of the demand model.
The second panel of Table 4 gives the results from a regression of marginal costs on product
characteristics. I show the results under perfect competition (a regression of prices on characteris-
tics) and imperfect competition for both the RC Logit models. These results show that cost shifters
have the expected sign, i.e., increases in labor cost increase marginal costs, and larger, more pow-
erful cars are also costlier. The final specification instruments for endogenous characteristics and
this reduces the precision. All marginal cost regressions show that increasing the fuel efficiency of
the vehicle is costly. A one-unit decrease in liters per 100km increases the cost by 2.7% to 4.7%.
In the counterfactuals, I base the main results on the engineering cost function. I favor the
engineering costs for several reasons. Estimation of (12) relies on changes in fuel consumption
observed in the pre-policy sample 1998-2007. The pre-policy period has limited variation in fuel
consumption; see Appendix Figure A1. The slope of the estimated cost function to fuel costs is
not robust to changes in control variables.43 The specification with instrument set Z2
′
has very
large standard errors, pointing out that this parameter is difficult to estimate. The engineering
estimates exclusively focus on technologies to decrease fuel consumption. In the estimated cost
equation, multicollinearity makes it difficult to separate changes in fuel consumption from other
attribute changes as carmakers redesign the whole vehicle when releasing a new version.
Finally, I use the model to compute the cost slope that rationalizes the fuel consumption choices
of firms before the policy. When consumers care less about fuel costs, it becomes less attractive for
firms to provide fuel consumption reductions. Allowing for more endogenous variables in the RC
Logit model lowers consumer valuation for fuel costs. The marginal benefit of fuel consumption
reductions for firms decreases, so does the implied marginal cost slope in (8). The model with
endogenous characteristics implies a pre-policy intercept of the cost slope that is five times less
steep than what the price endogeneity model implies. Cost increases caused by the policy are lower
when the initial intercept is lower, so it is more likely the emission standard increases welfare.
In summary, emissions enter the model through two channels. First, all else equal, consumers
dislike vehicles that have higher actual emissions because they are more costly to operate. Second,
producing vehicles with lower emissions is costly for manufacturers. The first channel matters
for all compliance strategies, while the second channel matters to evaluate the cost changes from
technology adoption.
43The regression of the predicted marginal costs on fuel costs results in a positive sign when I change time and
market controls, so that fuel economy lowers the marginal costs. These issues could be due to multicollinearity as well




I use the estimated model to compare the welfare effects of emission standards with various compli-
ance strategies. I start by describing the solution methods and computation of welfare. I describe
the welfare impact of the EU emission standard, the role of the attribute basing, the role of en-
forcement, and the importance of the cost assumptions. These results show the main contribution
of the paper, i.e., the design of emission standards has an impact on the abatement choices of firms
and the abatement choices matter for the welfare impact of the standard.
Simulation setup The goal of the welfare simulation is to find the welfare effects of the intro-
duction of the EU emission standard, to test the robustness to the economic assumptions, and to
compare its effects with alternative policy designs. Solving for the system of equations (7), (8), (9),
C(t, g) and the policy target is computationally infeasible. Solving the full system would require
a solution for j unknown prices, t’s and g’s in each country, information on sunk costs, as well
as a λ for each firm. I make two simplifications. First, the first-order conditions for gaming (9)
are satisfied only when the sunk cost of gaming is positive. This cost is challenging to determine
as it depends on future legal fees, brand reputation, and hidden efforts. I use the reduced form
results from Section 3 to fix the level of gaming. I assume that each percentage improvement in
fuel consumption includes 70% gaming and 30% actual technology. I solve (7) and (8) for prices
and technology while imposing that every 0.3 units of t imply 0.7 units of g. When discussing the
role of gaming and enforcement, I vary this ratio so that, either each unit of technology translates
fully to actual emission, or technology only affect official emissions and equals gaming. Second, I
reduce the number of conditions to solve for by assuming that firms implement the same amount
of technology fleet-wide. Firm-wide technology reduces the number of equations in (8) from j to
the number of firms.
I compute the counterfactual for a binding regulation with a target to reduce sales-weighted
emissions to 130 g/km. I take the vehicle fleet of each firm in 2007 as given and improve the actual
emissions by 6%. This adjusts for the reduction in emissions that would have happened without
the regulation.44 The simulation keeps all vehicles and characteristics of this fleet fixed except
for price, technology, and gaming. Finally, I solve for the equilibrium so that each firm complies
exactly. In reality, this does not need to be the case, as firms may not comply with the standard
and pay fines.45 Though I cannot show the computed equilibria are unique, I find no other solutions
when varying starting values. Firms do not have an incentive to over-comply, as this would distort
choices further from the pre-policy equilibrium.
I run the following algorithm. Step 1 is to choose a value for the firm-level technology t and
44The different models estimated in Section 3 show a 0.7% to 1% annual decrease in emissions in the pre-policy
period. To adjust for the fact that the vehicle fleet would have improved without the policy, I endow the 2007 fleet
with a 6% reduction in emissions. This 6% equals 8 years (between 2007-2015) of 0.7% technology growth. The
hypothetical fleet is the baseline for the welfare computations.
45In equilibrium, this is not a constraint on the solution as all firms prefer compliance over paying fines in the main
scenario. In a scenario where I restrict firms to mix-shifting, the fines matter. I discuss this in Appendix A4.
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shadow cost λ. Given these values, I compute the changes in the marginal costs from technology
and the product price distortion implied by the shadow cost λ◦L for each product. Step 2 solves for
the Nash equilibrium in prices given the values chosen in Step 1 and solves for (7). Step 3 evaluates
if (8) and the regulatory target is satisfied, given the guess from Step 1 and the prices from Step
2. I then update the guess and repeat Steps 1-3 until we are sufficiently close to (8) and the policy
target. This final iteration gives the solutions for t, λ, prices and the implied amount of gaming.
To update the guess between Step 3 and Step 1, I use the least square nonlinear equation solver
provided by Knitro, with bounds on the parameters. The parameter space is bounded because the
shadow costs must be positive, and the technology improvements must be between 0 and 1.
Given the solution vectors of p, t and λ, I compute the changes in outcomes between the initial
equilibrium (no policy and 6% reduction in emissions) and the new equilibrium (binding emission
standard). All welfare changes give the total vehicle lifetime changes for one cohort of new vehicle
sales; the changes represent the cost or benefit of having an emission standard for one calendar
year. The direct effects of the regulation are the changes in consumer surplus, profits, and gains
from correcting externalities. I calculate consumer surplus with the log sum formula of Small and
Rosen (1981). I add a step when gaming fools consumers. Gaming creates a difference between
the decision and experience utility. To compute consumer surplus for non-sophisticated consumers,
I compute the size of the choice distortion created by the differences in decision and experience
utility. The consumer surplus partly comes from reduced fuel expenses. Approximately 60% of
these expenses are fuel taxes paid to the government.46 I obtain changes in profits from prices,
marginal costs and quantities. Emission standards do not result in monetary transfers from firms
to the government when every firm complies. To compute the changes in actual CO2 emissions,
I assume a vehicle lifetime of 15 years, a yearly mileage of 14,000km, and a discount rate of 6%
to capitalize on the yearly gains/losses in externalities.47 The mileage is assumed to be constant,
ignoring the possible rebound effects on the intensive margin. To compute the value of the CO2
reductions, I assume that each ton of CO2 has an external cost of e28.48
Finally, I compute two additional welfare effects of the policy that were not explicit targets
of the policymaker. The regulation changes the number of vehicles sold so that the size of the
market changes. Parry, Walls, and Harrington (2007) give an estimate for the total external cost
from driving for the US market. These externalities include local pollution, accident risks, and
congestion. Together, these are estimated to be more important than the CO2 externality. They
report an externality of e0.12 per kilometer. This number is probably not directly applicable
to the EU market but at least gives a sense of the relative importance of emissions and other
externalities.49 I report the gains from shrinking the size of the vehicle market using this e0.12
per kilometer number. Note that this is very optimistic, as the emission standard only targets
46Avoided fuel taxes are a transfer from the government to consumers of which the welfare change depends on the
marginal cost of public funds. I count reduced fuel expenses as a welfare gain.
47Yearly mileage and vehicle lifetime match statistics reported by Eurostat.
48This number comes from the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases (2016).
49This number is probably an upper bound for the EU since taxes on fuel and driving are, on average, higher than
in the US.
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the sales of new vehicles, not when they drive or how much they drive. When the new vehicle
fleet shrinks, it is very uncertain congestion will decrease, as existing vehicles might fill the gap. A
second additional welfare effect is related to the behavioral biases of consumers. Emission standards
can be a more actual tool to reduce pollution if consumers undervalue future fuel savings. Using
the same data and a similar methodology, in Grigolon, Reynaert, and Verboven (2018), we find
that the consumer undervaluation of fuel costs in the EU is at most modest.50 For the model with
endogenous characteristics, I find that consumers are more price-sensitive and value fuel costs less.
At these estimates using the annual mileage and interest rate of 6%, I find that consumers only value
a e1 reduction in future fuel costs at e0.42. The emission standard results in consumers purchasing
vehicles with lower fuel costs, and I include the future gains consumers obtain. I compute this by
changing the consumers’ experience utility from vehicles so that their valuation of net present fuel
costs is equal to their valuation of price. The change in the consumer surplus is paternalistic in the
sense that I take a stance on what consumer valuation should be, see Allcott (2016).
Welfare Effects Table 5 Column I shows the central welfare estimates for the EU emission
standard.51 The first panel gives changes in the size of the fleet and actual emissions. The second
panel shows the direct welfare effects: consumer surplus, profits, and value of actual emissions. The
third panel gives the indirect welfare effects of other externalities and undervaluation. The different
scenarios I-VII change the design of the regulation or the abatement strategies. In Columns I-III, I
assume that 70% of official emission reductions are due to gaming, the standard is attribute-based,
consumers are sophisticated and do not respond to gaming, and technology increases the marginal
costs through the engineering cost function starting at ĉ′t=0. Column I solves for optimal firm
strategy so that firms can employ mix-shifting and technology (and gaming). Column II restricts
the firm abatement strategy to technology adoption, and Column III restricts it to mix-shifting,
both Columns solve for optimal prices, but only in Column III does the regulation enter the pricing
first-order condition.
Columns I and II are almost equivalent, showing that firms choose to abate almost entirely by
technology adoption and gaming.52 In the baseline estimate of Column I, we see that the emission
standard reduces sales by 1% and actual emissions by 4.9%. The standard did not change the share
of small vehicles (defined as the compact and subcompact vehicle classes). If firms had responded
by mix-shifting (Column III), we would see stark decreases in sales and actual emissions and a
stark increase in the market share for small vehicles. The difference between Column II and III
illustrates that the abatement strategy chosen by firms is crucial for the market outcomes of the
50Additionally, recent work in the US has found limited to no undervaluation for fuel costs. See Busse, Knittel,
and Zettelmeyer (2013), Allcott and Wozny (2014) and Sallee, West, and Fan (2016)
51The table presents the simulation outcomes at the estimated parameters and a 90% confidence interval. The C.I.
is computed by taking 50 draws from the estimated parameter variance-covariance matrix (assuming a joint normal
distribution). For each draw of parameters, the supply side is re-estimated and new simulation outcomes computed.
I compute the bootstrap from the differences between these 50 outcomes and the outcome at the mean parameters.
52The percentage improvements in technology in both scenarios are almost equal with differences of 0.1% points




The second panel of Table 5 shows the welfare effects of the regulation. I find that the EU stan-
dard decreased both the consumer surplus and profits by e2.6 billion and e0.6 billion, respectively.
Profit losses originate from firms taking up technology beyond the marginal benefit in the absence
of the policy. In turn, this increases the prices for consumers above their willingness to pay for fuel
consumption. The CO2 reduction of 5% is much lower than the policy target because of gaming.
The actual emission savings are worth only e0.3 billion, which is much less than the private losses.
Dividing private losses by tons of CO2, I find an implied value of the government for a ton of CO2
of e265. This number is much higher than the estimated levels of the social cost of carbon. The
effect on consumer surplus and profits is even more negative with mix-shifting. Because fuel taxes
are already correcting for more than the carbon externality in the EU, the policy overshoots and
requires reductions in emissions that are very costly.53
However, the policy has two potential indirect benefits that I report in the final panel of Table
5. First, a decrease in sales reduces other externalities from traffic. Given the assumption of e0.12
per km, the reduction in traffic increases welfare by e2.2 billion. This number is substantial, and
as explained above, is most likely an upper bound. Second, correcting undervaluation reduces con-
sumer surplus losses significantly by e1.5 billion. Because consumers undervalue fuel consumption
in the RC Logit model with endogenous attributes, the reduced future fuel expenses of the new
choices benefit consumers in the future more than they value today. Both these indirect welfare
effects need to be added in full to find positive welfare effects.54
Attribute basing In the baseline result, I find that firms choose to abate almost exclusively
by lowering the official emission rates. The reason for this choice is the attribute basing of the
standard. Table 5 Column IV gives the welfare effects of compliance to a flat standard. This
scenario leads to larger price changes and more actual emission savings. Why does a flat standard
result in more mix-shifting? Because of the slope in the target, more low weight products are now
above the target, as illustrated for Fiat in Figure 2. The Figure plots all the products in the fleet,
scaled by sales, in the emission-vehicle weight space, and shows that many products in the lower left
are below the red flat target but above the green sloped target. For all these products, the policy is
an implicit subsidy under a flat standard but an implicit tax for the attribute-based standard. The
attribute basing makes mix-shifting much more costly because the firm has much fewer products
to which it can shift sales.
53See Parry, Heine, Lis, and Li (2014) for a comparison between EU fuel taxes and externalities. In Appendix Table
A7, I show that a tax on carbon emissions of vehicles, chosen so that it reduces emissions with the same amount as
the standard, would also cost e344 per ton of CO2. However, the tax would increase overall welfare by e5 billion
because of savings in other externalities. The costs per ton of carbon across scenarios are among the highest of
alternative policies studied in the US, see Gillingham and Stock (2018).
54Appendix Table A7 shows the simulation results with the estimates of the RC Logit with only price endogeneity.
The results imply a higher consumer valuation for fuel costs so that the simulation starts from a steeper point on the
convex cost curve. Decreases in sales, emissions, consumer surplus, profits, and other externalities are much larger

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Why was the EU emission standard attribute-based? Deters (2010) describes the legislation
process in detail. He gives the following quote from French president Nicolas Sarkozy, favoring
a flat regulation: “There is no legitimate reason to give the buyer of a heavy vehicle a right to
more pollution than any other buyer.” While Romano Prodi, Italian Prime Minister, stated the
following: “A steeper value curve would lead to a significant distortion of competition and an
illegitimate hardship for the producers of small cars.” Both these statements contrast with Angela
Merkel, Chancellor of Germany, who stated the following: “The proposed value curve is already a
reduction duty far above average for larger cars.” Germany proposed a steeper target with a slope
of a = 0.06 instead of 0.04 that would require lower compliance effort from German firms. The
attribute basing was the result of a political agreement between car producing countries.
In Table 6, I compare the effects of attribute-based and flat regulation. I compare the profits,
technologies, and shadow costs for different firms averaged per production region, i.e., Asia, France,
Germany, Italy, and the US. The left panel gives changes of compliance to the ABR when firms
choose optimally or when I restrict the firms to mix-shift. The right panel does the same for the
flat target. When I restrict firms to mix-shift, the shadow costs of the regulation increases with
attribute basing. On average, the shadow cost of the regulation triples from 0.29 to 0.94 when
introducing attribute basing. To see this, compare λ and λ′ in II and IV. Fiat, the only Italian
firm, would have automatically complied with a flat target, while they have the highest shadow cost
under the attribute-based standard. Because mix-shifting in response to the ABR is so costly for
Fiat (and for Asian firms), it abates emissions mostly by technology and gaming. The implications
for market equilibrium are substantial because when some firms start improving emission ratings
(and consumers benefit from lower fuel costs), other firms face competitive pressure to follow. This
equilibrium behavior explains why we see a shift from some technology and some mix-shifting in
Column III to almost exclusively technology and gaming in Column I.
The changes in profits in Table 6 show that French and Italian firms benefit from a flat standard,
while all the compliance costs fall on German firms. This result is in line with positions the
countries took when bargaining over regulation. The policy debate in 2007 focused mainly on these
distributional issues and not on the effect of the slope on the likelihood of different abatement
strategies and clearly shows the importance of the political economy of the regulation. The ABR
was agreed such that all firms would have similar distances from the target and would face similar
compliance efforts. However, this design made mix-shifting more expensive so that the industry
needed to reduce the official emission numbers to be able to comply with the regulation.
Enforcement Interestingly, it is again national interests that led to the weak enforcement of
emission testing and ultimately led to gaming. In a recent report, the European Parliament (Gieseke
and Gerbandy (2017)) blamed both the European Commission and the member states for allowing
firms to game emission tests. Member states contravened their legal obligation to monitor and
enforce defeat devices. France, Germany, and Italy had evidence that emission control systems
did not focus on actual emissions. The report states that these countries did not take steps to
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Figure 2: Position of the Fiat fleet relative to flat and attribute-based target























Figure plots every vehicle sold by Fiat in 2007 as it appears in the base scenario in the counterfactual. Each blue
circle is a product and circles scale with sales. The red line is the flat target at 130 grams of CO2 per km and the
green line is the attribute-based target.
Table 6: Profits and Stringency per Producing State
ABR Flat
I II III IV
Solve for: t, λ λ t, λ′ λ′
∆ Prof. t λ ∆ Prof. λ ∆ Prof. t λ ∆ Prof. λ
Asia -212 14 0.09 -1660 1.33 -380 2 0.33 -163 0.41
France 23 4 0.04 1527 0.45 382 0 0.04 1296 0.05
Germany -635 13 0.08 -1855 0.93 -1287 8 0.33 -3196 0.57
Italy -84 8 0.07 -682 1.12 28 0 0.00 281 0.00
US -44 8 0.06 86 0.85 299 3 0.21 578 0.43
The table gives the average shadow costs and changes in profits in millions of euros relative to no policy
for German, Italian, French, Asian, and US firms from abatement in response to both the attribute-based
Regulation and a Flat Regulation. In all solutions, there is no gaming. Solution I solves for equilibrium
abatement to the ABR, II allows only for mix-shifting. Solution III solves for equilibrium abatement to the
flat standard, IV allows only for mix-shifting.
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understand the performance gap between official and actual emission, indicating maladministration.
The report also blames member states for under-funding testing facilities (in practice, carmakers
funded the testing facilities themselves). Even after the Volkswagen scandal in the US, most member
states did not start immediate and consistent investigations, nor did they adopt a dissuasive penalty
system. Additionally, the European Commission failed to oversee the enforcement of member
states. In summary, the car-producing countries were aware of the gaming but failed to enforce the
regulation. The overseeing European Commission, in its turn, failed to follow up on the signals
that downstream enforcement was failing.
Columns I, V and VI of Table 5 shed light on the economic consequences of weak enforcement.
The difference between Columns I and V is the consumer’s awareness of gaming. In Column I, the
gaming does not affect consumer choice, while it does in Column V. When gaming fools consumers,
they perceive cars to have lower fuel consumption, and discover this to be wrong while driving. This
choice distortion to consumers causes a further reduction in consumer surplus. Additionally, the
firms increase prices because products are perceived to be of higher quality. The situation is worse
for the environment as the standard causes almost no reductions in sales and actual emissions.
Overall, the regulation now has a negative welfare effect, even when accounting for the indirect
effects. Column VI shows the welfare effects under a standard with full enforcement. Enforcement
increases private losses in consumer surplus and profits but leads to much higher CO2 and other
externality savings. Column VI is the simulation that shows the highest welfare numbers when
including the indirect welfare effects, but the EU failed to attain this. Finally, if abatement was
100% gaming, there would be no changes in the static equilibrium with sophisticated consumers.
Carmakers would report different official emissions to the regulator, but prices and fuel costs would
remain the same.
The evidence presented here shows that the design of the regulation is responsible for the
observed outcome. First, the political bargaining between France, Germany, and Italy led to an
attribute-based standard with a steep slope. The attribute basing increased the cost of mix-shifting
as an abatement strategy and increased the likelihood of compliance by gaming and technology
adoption. Next, enforcement failures on the level of the member states enabled firms to resort to
gaming.
Cost function and investment inefficiencies In the main simulation, the costs for technology
adoption start at the point where the marginal benefits of emission reductions equal marginal costs.
The engineering reports, however, present a cost function that starts with a lower slope than the
estimated point concurring with the economic model. If the engineers are correct, this means that
firms leave money on the table, i.e., they do not choose to adopt available cost-actual technology
for which consumers have a willingness to pay.55 Additionally, Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins (2005)
point to market failures in the supply and adoption of technology such as spillovers in technology,
spillovers in adoption, and incomplete information about future returns of the investment. The
55Notice that the main results already account for the welfare effects of potential undervaluation by consumers;
here, I consider the suboptimal technology adoption of firms.
35
result of these market failures could be a socially sub-optimal equilibrium with no or too little
investment and technology adoption. The regulation gives clear and binding efficiency targets for
the whole industry. It might have succeeded in moving the industry out of a sub-optimal equilibrium
by inducing technology adoption. The framework here allows to compute welfare effects of the
emission standard when the supply-side undervalues technology.56
By comparing Column VI and VII in Table 5, I find that supply-side failures in technology
adoption are not necessarily bad for welfare when externalities are at play. Because of the inexpen-
sive technology, the regulation makes firms reduce fuel consumption for less than the consumers’
willingness to pay. Vehicles become cheaper, as consumers receive better characteristics for a price
below their willingness to pay. As such, the market size increases rather than decreases. The reg-
ulation now has a rebound effect on the extensive margin.57 The inexpensive technology reduces
consumer and profit losses but also wipes out the savings in other externalities so that, surprisingly,
more technology adoption is not necessarily better for welfare. The regulation pushes firms beyond
what could be explained by market failures, a policy that only requires cost-efficient technology has
a less stringet target than existing policy. In general, I believe this scenario is not very credible. In
line with Anderson and Sallee (2011), I expect carmakers to abate emissions with the least costly
compliance strategies. If technology is so cheap and would have cost only e190 million in variable
profits, then why would firms have resorted to gaming?
In Appendix Table A7 Column II, I show the results with the estimated cost function specified
in (12). The results are similar to the main scenario, but the estimated cost function is less convex
than the engineering cost function and results in lower consumer and profit losses.
Sunk Costs The profit changes reported in Table 5 are changes in variable profits. Both tech-
nology adoption and gaming potentially have sunk costs. I explain the underlying sources of sunk
costs, and then I compute an upper bound on these costs by computing deviations in variable
profits from optimal strategies.
The fixed costs of technology adoption contain the development of technology, implementation
of technology, and the redesign of the vehicle. Engineers stated that the technology to attain
emission reductions was available at the time of the policy. The policy allowed for 8 years between
announcement and enforcement. Vehicles typically go through faster redesign cycles, see Blonigen,
Knittel, and Soderbery (2017). The additional sunk costs of redesigning are thus likely to be small.
Because of the availability of technology and no additional redesign cycles, I expect little additional
sunk costs of technology except for the adoption itself.
Gaming has expected sunk costs. The defeat devices used to game the emission tests have to
56Recent work, such as Hashmi and Van Biesebroeck (2016) and Aghion, Dechezlepretre, Hemous, Martin, and
Reenen (2016), has looked at R&D patterns in the automobile industry through patents.
57See Gillingham, Kotchen, Rapson, and Wagner (2013) for an overview of the possible sources of rebound effects.
A second rebound effect is an increase in vehicle usage, a rebound effect on the intensive margin. A further rebound
effect could come from the use of savings on vehicle expenses on other energy-intensive activities. Lastly, a decrease
in the demand for fuels might lower the price of oil, causing a macro-economic rebound effect. Here, I only focus on
the rebound effect on the extensive margin. The reported emission savings are an upper bound on the total savings.
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be purchased or designed. Firms also face the risk of liability for noncompliance and class actions
from consumers and shareholders. A complicating factor is that firms use similar defeat devices
to avoid pollution standards so that the legal cases are both about misrepresenting pollutants and
fuel economy. It is unclear if I should attribute all of these costs to the emission standard.
Given the estimated static model, I can compute an implied upper bound of sunk costs from the
changes in variable profits when firms deviate from the optimal strategy.58 Appendix A6 discusses
the computation of the bounds. I find that the sum of the upper bounds for all firms equals e70
billion. The findings show that firms are willing to sink high amounts to comply with gaming and
technology adoption. It also means that the modest positive welfare numbers presented in Table
5 are not sufficient to claim that the regulation had any positive effect. Carmakers are currently
defendants in multiple legal cases, the efforts and costs related to these cases are an additional
welfare loss so that the regulation has at best zero effect on welfare.
7 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the response to the 2015 EU-wide emission standard. I find that between
2007 and 2011, official sales-weighted emissions from new sales decreased by 14%. A decomposition
shows that two-thirds of the decrease in emissions is attributable to firms gaming emission tests.
One-third of the decrease stems from actual technology adoption. The projected carbon savings
did not materialize because of noncompliance. The reasons that firms chose gaming and technology
adoption are attribute basing and a lack of enforcement. Both reasons are a product of the EU
political environment. A structural model of demand and supply, allowing for endogenous abate-
ment choices, reveals that the overall effect of the regulation has been negative for consumers and
producers. For the regulation to be welfare-improving, non-targeted externalities, such as accidents
and local pollution, and corrections in undervaluation need to be counted.
This exercise provides important lessons for studying emission standards. First, the abatement
strategy that firms use matters for policy outcomes. Policy design has large impacts on which
strategies firms employ. I show that attribute basing made mix-shifting so costly that some firms
had to decrease the emission ratings. Second, politics matter for the design, implementation, and
enforcement of standards. Third, technology adoption is a crucial mechanism of compliance and
needs consideration when evaluating emission standards. This is difficult because the evaluation
depends on assumptions about the cost curve of technology adoption. The economic model in this
paper estimates technology adoption costs to be higher than projections of engineers, even after
accounting for consumers’ undervaluation of fuel consumption reductions. It is crucial to further
our understanding of why firms might face high costs when adopting greener technologies.
Overall, I want to stress that emission standards are a risky and unpredictable policy instrument
58In this setting, I can compute deviations from the single equilibrium with optimal compliance strategies. From
observing multiple compliance choices in multiple markets, I could use a moment inequality estimator to estimate
the sunk costs, see Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2015). Here, I can only compute a single deviation profit for each
firm implied by the simultaneous game.
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when the goal is to reduce carbon emissions. Standards rely on emission tests that are gameable
when compliance costs become very high. It is uncertain that emissions reduce because of the
policy. If the engineers are correct and cost-actual technology is available, then standards might
increase the size of the market rather than decrease it, causing an increase in emissions. The EU
could introduce the transport sector into the emission trading system so that the vehicle market
contributes to the prices of carbon permits and abatement costs equalize across sectors. Since all
EU countries have very high fuel taxes that cover more than the carbon externality, it is difficult to
understand why the EU chose for emission standards. The EU has limited fiscal authority to raise
taxes. The EU parliament recently approved more stringent emission standards for 2021 to 2030.
These standards are so stringent that combustion engines are not capable of reaching the target,
which implies an imposed shift to alternative fuels.
The numbers derived in this paper are obtained under various assumptions and limitations.
First, I focus only on the sales of new vehicles and assume no effects on prices and vehicle lifetimes
in the used car market. It would be interesting to study different effects of gaming, technology
adoption, and pricing on this market. Second, all welfare numbers ignore possible rebound effects on
driving behavior. Third, I did not include dynamics in the analysis. Fixed costs from the standard
on the firm side might have effects on the market structure, and rapid technology adoption might
result in consumers strategically timing purchases. Even without these complications, the results
presented here show that the welfare effects from emission standards are far from obvious and that
the design of the regulation matters for which abatement strategies firms choose.
The data underlying this article are proprietary and are provided to the author under licence.
The replication package describes in detail how researchers can obtain access to the data. DOI:
10.5281/zenodo.4013683
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